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Who Loaded What, When, 
and Where: Capt. James 
McKay and the Spanish-
American War 
Arrival of a battalion at Tampa in 1898. (Courtesy of the Henry B. Plant Museum Photographic 
Collection.) 
Joe Knetsch , Ph.D. 
Paµ1ela K. Gibson 
he usual story of the Tampa-based 
preparations for the Spanish-
American War is one of confusion, 
incompetence and near chaos on 
the waterfront. Testimony of many high-
ranking and important officers and volun-
teers noted the general lack of organization 
in the loading of the transport fleet prior to 
the invasion of Cuba. Most of the regular of-
ficers also noted the lack of transports, the 
fact that only one rail line went to the Port 
of Tampa, and that the railroad cars were 
mostly unlabeled and had to be opened in-
dividually to discover their contents. Sto-
ries of rotten beef, spoiled hardtack, and 
railroad cars sitting for weeks on sidings 
with perishable foodstuffs inside: all these 
made spectacular headlines in many news-
papers. The infamous "embalmed beef" 
scandal played well in the "Yellow Journal-
ism" of the day. Public outcry demanded 
that all of these horrific events had to be in-
vestigated to provide an answer to the ques-
tion: How can they be prevented from ever 
happening again? The real question is, did 
they ever happen at all? And, whether they 
happened or were invented, who was to 
blame? 
In one of the more startling chapters in 
the history of the "Splendid Little War,'' an 
entire army was fitted out in Tampa, Flori-
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da and prepared to invade Cuba. Tampa in 
1898 was a growing town of just over 14,000 
souls with few modern facilities. Its munic-
ipal streets were unpaved and mostly cov-
ered with Florida's ubiquitous sand. Few 
buildings were up-to-date; most were run-
down unpainted wooden structures. The 
only spectacular building in the area was 
Henry Bradley Plant's luxurious Tampa Bay 
Hotel, opened in 1891 on the banks of the 
Hillsborough River. The town did have two 
railroads entering it but only one track 
went to Port Tampa, nine miles south of the 
Tampa town center. There, one major quay 
awaited the military transports of the War; 
that quay normally accommodated nine 
ships with ease. In an emergency, Tampa 
could have handled an army of about 5000, 
but not one of nearly 30,000, which is ap-
proximately what finally showed up for the 
affair.I 
Tampa was one of three major points 
chosen for the gathering of the army. New 
Orleans and Mobile also played minor roles 
in the impending war, but Tampa was desig-
nated by the joint Army-Navy Strategy 
Board as the point of debarkation in the 
original plan for the invasion of Cuba. This 
plan called for an army of about 6000 men 
to be shipped to the southern coast of Cuba 
and to deliver arms, ammunition and other 
supplies to General Maximo Gomez, the 
leader of the Cuban forces in the Eastern 
Provinces. The troops headed to Cuba un-
der this plan were to be a reconnaissance-
in-force and not an actual invasion group. 
On April 29, 1898, General of the Army 
Nelson Miles chose Brigadier General 
William Rufus Shafter to assemble this 
force at Tampa. Shafter was advised to 
avoid any direct action in Cuba and to "give 
aid and succor to the insurgents, to render 
the Spanish forces as much injury as possi-
ble, [while) avoiding serious injury to your 
own command." The men Shafter com-
manded were all to be regular army, with no 
volunteers contemplated. But war had been 
declared on the 25th of April and the pres-
sure on President William McKinley and 
Congress was intense and argued for the 
use of a large volunteer force. Admiral 
George Dewey's surprising victory in Mani-
la changed the battle plans, and what had 
started out as a diversionary attack now 
brought on the possibility of greater action 
and acquisition.2 The Philippine victory 
would have major consequences for Tampa. 
On April 30, President McKinley and 
Secretary of War Russell Alger sent a note 
to General Shafter canceling his reconnais-
sance-in-force and advising him to continue 
troop preparations. In Washington, the 
Army and Navy were debating which strat-
egy was to prevail. The Navy insisted on the 
blockade and bombardment of Havana and 
other major positions. By coordinating the 
Army, the Navy, and the Cuban insurgents, 
Admiral William T. Sampson and others felt 
that the Spanish Army in Cuba could be 
starved into submission. The potential 
hitch in this plan was the whereabouts and 
power of the Spanish Navy, led by Admiral 
Pascual de Cervera. As it turned out, the U.S. 
Navy strategists over-estimated the power, 
speed, and ability of the Spaniards. Many of 
the Spanish fleet's ships were not as well-
armed as thought. Some were not even 
completed vessels and were still under con-
struction when the fleet left the Cape Verde 
Islands for the theater of engagement. Over-
all, U.S. intelligence about the fleet was lim-
ited and the overseas network of agents 
very amateurish. The Office of Naval Intel-
ligence was relatively new, understaffed, 
and saddled with more responsibilities than 
it could handle at that stage of its develop-
ment.3 Added to the intelligence deficit was 
Admiral Sampson's lack of effective block-
ading vessels with enough fire-power to 
effect his plans. Thus the President, Secre-
tary Alger, General Miles, and others sent 
new orders to Shafter. 
In analyzing the force needed to take 
Cuba, the Army debated the force's size and 
the site of invasion over and over. Following 
a report from Shafter that his advance com-
mand was ready to move, Alger and Miles 
instructed him to be ready to move out on 
May 9, 1898. Shafter's command was to be 
augmented by the regular forces then at 
Chickamauga and the Gulf ports. The addi-
tional 12,000 to 15,000 men, the strategists 
reasoned, would be enough to take Mariel 
and possibly Havana if they acted quickly 
and decisively. During this same time 
McKinley issued his famous call for volun-
teers, which would bring the invasion force 
to about 70,000. Most of the volunteers 
were National Guardsmen, with a strong 
lobby in each state capital. The political 
pressure to swear in and activate these 
troops was tremendous, but so were the 
problems. Many of these troops were al-
ready partially trained in Army fashion, but 
View of the wharf at Port Tampa during the Spanish-American War. (Courtesy of the Tampa Bay 
History Center Collection.) 
most had obsolete weapons. Few had uni-
forms and most did not seriously train 
every month. Consequently, the mobiliza-
tion was slow. With the Spanish Navy still at 
large in the Atlantic, potentially posing a 
threat to the North American coastline, the 
orders to sail were delayed. 
A direct assault on a fortress as well-de-
fended as Havana was reckoned to be cost-
ly. The timing of the battle plan would also 
place any possible attack at the beginning 
of the rainy season, complicating the op-
eration even more. General Nelson Miles 
strongly urged against such an assault, 
based upon his experiences in the Civil War 
and his vast knowledge of military strategy 
and tactics. Instead, the General advised an 
attack on the southern coast of Cuba, 
preferably on the weakly defended eastern 
end. An offensive launched from this loca-
tion would be less costly in lives and pre-
sent the best opportunity to use the Cuban 
forces to help destroy Spain's hold on the is-
land. The discovery of Admiral Cervera's 
fleet in the area of Martinique on May 13 al-
lowed the administration a "publicly accept-
able excuse for postponing a campaign that 
the Army was not yet ready to launch."4 
Between May 9 and 14, Shafter was re-
inforced by about 6000 troops, bringing his 
command to approximately 12,000 men. A 
plan was launched to send the majority of 
this force to Key West, until it was discov-
ered that the drinking water in that island 
city was running short with just the de-
mands made upon it by the Navy and the 
civilian population. Water would have to be 
shipped into that port before any assault 
could be launched from there. The Key 
West plan was scratched and the new vol-
unteer troops and other regulars from along 
the eastern seaboard were sent to Tampa, 
which by May 25 had over 17 ,000 men un-
der arms awaiting the word to invade Cuba. 
The number of troops in Tampa then out-
numbered the city's civilian population. 
The camp at Tampa Heights and the one at 
the Port of Tampa were already overcrowd-
ed. The City of West Tampa opened its arms 
to the incoming forces until it also had 
more than it could handle. Troops were 
transferred to new camps in Lakeland and 
Jacksonville. s 
The constantly changing plans, strategy 
and orders put a heavy strain on Shafter 
and his command. Additionally, the com-
mand also had to assist in preparing and 
staffing three separate expeditions to Cuba 
47 
48 
to deliver guns, ammunition and medical 
supplies to the Cuban insurgents. Two of 
these excursions were led by Captain J.H. 
Dorst of the Fourth Cavalry. The first of his 
attempts to land supplies and troops met 
with stiff opposition by the Spanish com-
mand at Point Abolitas, about forty miles 
east of Havana. The commander of the 
Spanish forces, Colonel Balboesis, was 
killed in the action, but his men succeeded 
in driving the United States troops off be-
fore they could accomplish their goal. The 
second expedition was very successful in 
delivering 7500 rifles, 1,300,000 rounds of 
ammunition and 20,000 rations to the 
Cuban forces at Port Banes on the northern 
coast of Cuba. The last of the three expedi-
tions, under the command of Lieutenant 
C.P. Johnson, consisted of men of the Tenth 
Cavalry, the famed Buffalo Soldiers, and 
375 armed Cubans. This hugely successful 
expedition included the troop- and supply-
carrying ships Florida and Fanita, the lat-
ter owned by Captain James McKay of Tam-
pa. Landing near Palo Alto, the party met 
resistance from a Spanish force. The Army 
took casualties (one dead and nine wound-
ed) in the short but spirited engagement 
that followed. These shipments and deliver-
ies of arms, ammunitions and supplies were 
an added burden to Shafter and his staff, 
but they helped to keep up morale and in-
terest in the impending Cuban invasion.6 
The United States Army was organized 
during this war into eight different Corps. 
Each Corps was approximately 30,000 men 
divided into three divisions. The divisions 
were further divided into three brigades and 
these divided into three regiments. The 
Corps were composed only of infantry. Cav-
alry and artillery units were assigned to 
assist each Corps, but were relatively in-
dependent in operation. The Fifth and 
Seventh Corps called Tampa home at the 
beginning of the conflict. The Fifth Corps 
was composed mostly of regular troops aug-
mented by some volunteer units as they ar-
rived in camp. It was the Fifth Corps that 
received the honor of spearheading the in-
vasion of Cuba. 7 
The biggest obstacle to the invasion of 
Cuba was the lack of nearly everything. 
Transports were the first priority for the 
Army, but it had never before had to build, 
rent or contract for such a large number of 
vessels. The U.S. Army had only invaded 
one other country (Mexico) in its history 
and that was in the 1840s. It had no experi-
ence with water-borne invasions. The only 
sea-going transports available to the Army 
were run-down old coastal vessels, the Navy 
having taken most of the faster, lighter ves-
sels for use as cruisers.8 Congress was not 
helpful. That august body was chronically 
resistant to any enlargement of the Army 
during peace-time. Since the Civil War, the 
Army had been consistently cut in size and 
was under-funded in almost every depart-
ment. It had only enough weapons on hand 
to field a force of 25,000 men, yet in 1898 it 
was fighting essentially a two-front war in 
Cuba and the Philippines. The Quartermas-
ter Corps was relatively small at the out-
break of the war and had not ordered 
enough materials to handle an army of 
more than 25,000, the approximate size of 
the effective troops available for service.9 At 
the beginning of the War, it should be re-
membered, the plans did not call for a full-
scale invasion, and the Quartermaster's and 
Commissary's staffs were gearing up for on-
ly a small reconnaissance-in-force type of 
operation. No U.S. military leader had ever 
led a force larger than a regiment. Most of 
the activity between the Civil War and the 
Spanish-American War had been against 
the western tribes of Native Americans, and 
these campaigns rarely required more than 
a regiment. Most of the companies in the 
regular regiments had not worked together 
at all. Regimental-scale war games or ma-
neuvers were unheard of until later. All told, 
the Army was simply not prepared to un-
dergo an operation like the invasion of Cu-
ba. Everything had to be learned from ex-
perience and that was going to be a hard 
teacher.10 
The general lack of military readiness 
was exemplified by America's coastal de-
fense. Military historian Walter Millis, in his 
classic Arms and Men: A Study of Ameri-
can Military History , made the following 
observation: "In 1897 the truest symbol of 
American military policy was still the 
heavy, immovable and purely defensive sea-
coast gun." When the war seemed unavoid-
able, McKinley asked Congress for addition-
al funding and received in return the "Fifty 
Million Dollar Bill" to fund the war. The 
Army, reflecting outmoded thinking and re-
sponding to the fears of Congressmen from 
the coastal states, spent the majority of its 
allotment on coastal defense. Very little 
funding went to the Quartermaster's Corps, 
the Medical Corps or the Signal Corps.11 
When the Endicott Board met in 1885, it 
had recommended 2362 gun emplacements 
and batteries be installed to defend the 
American coastline. At the outbreak of the 
Cuba war only 151 had been installed. Con-
gressional under-funding haunted even this 
well-thought out plan.12 The coastal de-
fense system may have been the "truest 
symbol" of United States policy, but it did 
little to solve the problem of assembling the 
largest invasion force seen to date by the 
American public.13 
At Shafter's headquarters in Tampa, the 
biggest problem was getting the transports 
and loading them efficiently so they could 
be unloaded in the briefest time possible. 
An amphibious landing of the size contem-
plated for Cuba had never before been at-
tempted by the Army, and Shafter had no 
experienced help on his staff to solve the 
loading problems. At that juncture, the 
Quartermaster, Colonel Charles F. Hum-
phrey, discovered the talent needed was 
close at hand in the person of Captain 
James M. McKay, Jr. McKay had already 
been involved in the Cuban revolution and 
had run both guns and volunteer fighters to 
the island on the Fanita, his fast new 
ship.14 The Captain had long familiarity 
with the Cuban maritime trade. He earned 
his title of "Captain" by sailing with his fa-
ther in their beef business in Havana, and 
as the owner of the family shipping line at 
his father's death. In 1886, he threw in his 
lot with the Plant Steamship Company and 
captained the Plant System steam packets 
Mascotte and, later, Olivette. Both those 
ships and his own Fanita were to play im-
portant roles in the invasion and subse-
quent events. (McKay's long and distin-
guished career would later include two 
terms as a Florida Senator, United States 
Marshal for the southern district of Florida, 
two years as Mayor of Tampa, and Postmas-
ter of Tampa in 1914.) McKay's knowledge 
of the waters around Tampa Bay and along 
the Cuban coasts made him a valuable per-
son to the invasion, however it was his inti-
mate knowledge of the loading and unload-
ing of ships that made him indispensable.IS 
Colonel Humphrey was very pleased to 
have someone of McKay's experience on 
hand to assist in the complicated operation. 
In testimony before the Committee Investi-
gating the Conduct of the War (often called 
the "Dodge Committee" after its chairman, 
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Loading an artillery piece onto a transport at 
Port Tampa. (Courtesy of the Tampa Bay 
History Center Collection.) 
General Grenville M. Dodge), Humphrey 
stated: "He [McKay] was my principal assis-
tant. He came to me by order of the Secre-
tary of War and was a most valuable man. 
He had been a steamship captain, and a 
United States marshal more recently." The 
Colonel went on to describe his "principal 
assistant,'' in the following terms: "He was 
an exceedingly level-headed man. At Port 
Tampa, and subsequently in Cuba, his 
range of duties with ocean transportation 
were exceedingly great. He did everything 
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Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, left, 
speaks to Captain Lee of the British Army near 
one of the campsites in and around Tampa dur-
ing the build-up to the Spanish-American War. 
(Courtesy of the Tampa Bay History Center 
Collection.) 
an exceptionally good man could do in that 
very responsible position." Colonel Hum-
phrey also noted it was McKay's natural dis-
position to try and accommodate people, 
and he tried to procure for any officer what-
ever they requested. Most of the time, 
Humphrey noted, McKay was miles away 
from the war command and did much of the 
supervising of the unloading by himself .16 
This was a tremendous responsibility for a 
civilian working under a military comman-
der in time of war. 
Captain McKay's biggest problem was 
the loading of the materials at Port Tampa. 
To load the materials of war onto thirty-
eight transport ships not designed for 
wartime use meant that each one be fitted 
out for its new role. Cargo ships had to be 
made comfortable for the transport of 
troops and horses. Accommodations had to 
be fitted for the officers and medical staff. 
Supplies had to be placed in such an order 
so as to be convenient for debarkation in 
Cuba. All of this was made more difficult by 
the fact that many of the railroad cars filled 
with provisions, ammunition, weapons, for-
age, etc., were unlabeled and the bills-of-
lading had not arrived in Tampa to allow 
them to be sorted out before loading onto 
the ships. Colonel Humphrey described the 
resulting problems: "The loading of the 
transports was at best difficult, owing to the 
limited wharf facilities and not having on 
hand full cargoes; it being necessary to 
bring transports into the canal to be loaded, 
and often before loading could be complet-
ed sent them into the harbor, to be brought 
back in a future time to complete cargo."17 
Somehow, space had to be found for 16,154 
men and 834 officers, along with the large 
amount of military stores needed to con-
duct the campaign.18 It was miraculous that 
the entire operation was completed be-
tween 2:30 a.m. on June 7, 1898 and 9:00 
p.m. on the following day. Given the severe 
problems with unmarked railroad cars, im-
patient officers and men, a severe lack of 
lighters to haul materials to ships at anchor 
and a lack of trained stevedores on the 
docks, this was truly a miracle.19 That this 
was done with a relatively minimal number 
of breakdowns in the process is a tribute to 
Humphrey and McKay. 
During the operation, Captain McKay 
was involved in a number of high-level de-
cisions that profoundly affected the expedi-
tion. The original estimate for the number 
of troops that could be transferred to Cuba 
in the available ships was given as over 
30,000 men and material. McKay, with his 
expert knowledge of transports, advised 
Shafter that this number was too high and 
revised it to accommodate 24,000 men 
more comfortably. When the loading was in 
its final stages, McKay, along with General 
Henry W. Lawton, was assigned the task of 
adjusting the arrangements by moving 
troops from one ship to another, in order to 
give them as much room and freedom of 
movement as possible. McKay also oversaw 
the loading of the materials so that the am-
munition and rations would be off-loaded 
first, followed by the forage and medical 
supplies.20 For a civilian to undertake such 
responsibilities demonstrated McKay's abil-
ities and acumen, as well as the faith others 
had in him. When General Shafter appeared 
in front of the Dodge Commission, he 
specifically noted the service of Captain 
McKay and declared: "I regard him as a 
most efficient man; I am not a seafaring 
Supplies stacked next to the gangways, awaiting loading onto transports at Port Tampa. (Courtesy 
of the Tampa Bay History Center Collection.) 
man, but when a man goes about everything 
and makes no back steps, you don't have to 
have an expert opinion on him." Every es-
sential person involved in the loading oper-
ation knew that Captain McKay was in 
charge. He was obeyed as if he were a rank-
ing officer in the regular service.21 
This positive picture of the process of 
loading the troops and materials differs sub-
stantially from that offered by two of the 
more famous critics of the affair, Colonel 
Leonard Wood and Lieutenant Colonel 
Theodore Roosevelt. The "standard" ver-
sion of the story comes almost directly from 
Roosevelt's classic, The Rough Riders. In 
this highly colorful - and colored - ac-
count, the loading is filled with drama and 
foreboding, but ends with the happy seizure 
of the Yucatan by the Rough Riders and the 
fending off of the troops from the Seventy-
First New York Volunteers. Of course, the 
Second United States Regular Infantry are 
graciously allowed to board their vessel in 
time for departure. The story also suggests 
that the procedure was total chaos with no 
one in charge. Colonel Humphrey, in the 
account, "might just as well have been 
asleep, as nobody knew where he was and 
nobody could find him, and the quay was 
crammed with some ten thousand men, 
most of whom were working at cross pur-
poses." Only after a frantic search did Wood 
and Roosevelt find, by separate routes, 
Colonel Humphrey, and get the assurance 
that the Yucatan was their assigned trans-
port. 22 It was after this initial drama that 
the Rough Riders got to their ship and pre-
pared for their final destiny and future 
fame. 
Few have ever questioned this account 
by the future President, and nearly every 
biographer of "T.R." has repeated the story 
intact, but why not question Roosevelt's 
version of the event? Historians have long 
known that the future President was an 
"unreliable witness" when it came to many 
aspects of the war in Cuba. From his asser-
tions that he suffered with his troops in the 
sandy camp at Port Tampa while officers 
enjoyed the luxury of the Tampa Bay Hotel 
(where, in fact, Roosevelt stayed for three 
days with his wife Edith), to his claim that 
his unit attained the summit of Kettle Hill 
first (it was as likely that soldiers of the 
Ninth Cavalry did), Roosevelt's credibility is 
far from airtight. 
One of the key features in Roosevelt's 
portrait of confusion and chaos at the em-
barkation point in Tampa was the fact that 
there were, in the space of forty-eight 
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hours, nearly 17 ,000 men and prov1s10ns 
loaded onto the transport fleet and only one 
rail line feeding the quay. The image was of 
a mass of disorganized men and horses try-
ing to get onto their various ships. Stacking 
the vessels three wide in the canal also pre-
sented a picture of relative disorganization. 
However, given the enormity of the task and 
the efficiency with which it was performed, 
it is hardly likely that chaos reigned. Roo-
sevelt, it must be remembered, was a Lieu-
tenant Colonel of a regiment; orders may 
not have reached down that far in the chain 
of command. Both Humphrey and McKay 
testified that Shafter had approved a list of 
units to be placed upon each ship and that 
almost all reached their assigned destina-
tion in fairly good order. Most telling, as far 
as the accuracy of Roosevelt's account is 
concerned, is the fact that although reports 
indicate that everyone knew that McKay 
was in charge of the loading, "T.R." seemed 
unaware of that fact. He wrote the Dodge 
Commission that: "I never saw Captain 
McKay, and, indeed, never heard of him un-
til I heard of his testimony [to the Commis-
sion.) "23 As famous, energetic and politi-
cally astute, as he was, Roosevelt could not 
have had knowledge of everything, especial-
ly since he was relatively far down on the 
chain of command. 
James McKay's own testimony before 
the Dodge Commission sheds a great deal of 
light on the activities of this "level-headed" 
man and, as well, on the activities so criti-
cized by Roosevelt. During the greatest part 
of the brief war McKay was on active duty 
as Colonel Humphrey's assistant. He served 
from May 4 until August 30, 1898 with only 
ten days away from active duty. The ship 
captain testified that he was in charge of 
loading the stores of the commissary, quar-
termaster and artillery along with mules 
and wagons. McKay noted that each ship 
carried no fewer than 100,000 rations 
aboard and that many had more. This was 
enough to feed the troops while in transport 
and for the first few days after landing. The 
captain also stated that he only found five 
ships overcrowded in the initial loading and 
that these were soon relieved, with the sur-
plus troops being sent to less crowded ves-
sels. The Plant System steamer Olivette 
served as a hospital ship for the first part of 
the invasion. McKay oversaw the loading of 
124 wagons for the immediate forces and an 
additional 60 to 80 for those of General J . C. 
Bates. There were enough horses and mules 
loaded onto the transports to power these 
wagons. The biggest producer of later criti-
cism was the lack of ambulances, which 
Shafter had personally ordered left behind, 
rationalizing that the rough roads of Cuba 
would not cause anyone wounded to notice 
the difference between an ambulance and a 
wagon. The greatest problem for loading all 
the stores was the lack of space on the rail-
road line leading to the port. The conges-
tion and confusion of not having properly 
labeled cars also greatly hampered the load-
ing of the stores.24 
Captain McKay's testimony about the 
Rough Riders and the seizing of the Yu-
catan is most interesting. When questioned 
by General Dodge about the orders alleged-
ly received by these troops, the captain did 
not hesitate to declare that it was part of 
their orders to report to that ship. When 
asked about Colonel Wood's knowledge of 
the orders he stated: "He must have known 
it. He marched right aboard." When asked 
point blank about the Rough Riders seizing 
the Yucatan, McKay replied: "They didn't 
do anything of the kind." All of the boarding 
went pretty much as scheduled with little 
confusion, according to the captain. McKay 
presented a paper with notations of the 
troops to board the Yucatan. General James 
A. Beaver of the Pennsylvania Volunteers 
read this paper aloud: "Yucatan designated 
No. 8, headquarters band and companies C, 
D, G, and B, Second United States Infantry, 
First Regiment U. S. Volunteer Cavalry." 
General Beaver asked McKay if all that was 
designated before anyone went on board. 
"Yes sir; that was designated," replied 
McKay.25 It was this testimony of Captain 
McKay, countering Roosevelt's story of the 
event, that prompted "T.R." to write the 
Commission. 
General William R. Shafter had a good 
laugh over Roosevelt's seizure story. Upon 
hearing of the Roosevelt riposte to McKay's 
statements the gruff old veteran wrote to 
the Dodge Commission himself. In his letter 
of December 21, 1898, the General quoted 
a letter he had received from Major Leon S. 
Roudiez of the Quartermaster's Corps. Ma-
jor Roudiez wrote: "I have a distinct recol-
lection of meeting the wild and woolly 
'Rough Rider' [Roosevelt) at the foot of the 
gang plank as he was about to embark on a 
transport. His men had halted and were in a 
double column behind him. I did not know 
him at the time and, not noticing his rank, I 
asked for the officer in command ... He stat-
ed that he was in command of the regiment 
temporarily during Colonel Wood's ab-
sence." Roudiez's letter continued: "I then 
informed him that he was assigned to the 
transport before us and that he could march 
on board at any time. As we were talking 
Colonel Wood appeared upon the upper 
deck of the ship and hailed us. I repeated to 
Colonel Wood what I had said to Colonel 
Roosevelt, and went on. The 'Rough Rider' 
then galloped on board." Roudiez's final 
comment speaks directly to the discrepancy 
between Roosevelt's and McKay's version of 
the boarding. "There are a great many fun-
ny things testified to by various parties," he 
wrote, "who appear before the commission, 
and I really don't know whether it is worth 
while to worry about their statements or 
even pay the slightest attention to them."26 
Given Shafter's views on headline grabbing, 
the General undoubtedly enjoyed forward-
ing Roudiez's letter to the Commission. 
Some stories, scandals, and conflicted 
accounts of the War are not as well re-
searched as others. The widely publicized 
embalmed beef scandal, for example, was 
tackled by two different government com-
missions and found to be untrue. That the 
meat was the victim of being left on a side-
track for days on end in the heat of a Flori-
da June is not disputed. The heat did break 
down some of the chemical components of 
the beef packing and made some changes to 
the taste, but the product was not the cause 
of the illnesses reported. Indeed, more war-
time diseases were attributed to the heat, 
mosquitoes, and dehydration of the troops 
than to any foodstuffs sent for their meals. 
General Nelson Miles' charges of bad beef 
and inedible bread made his testimony 
sensational, but it did not make it true, as 
the two investigating commissions discov-
ered.27 Unsanitary conditions in many 
camps also added greatly to the suffering of 
the troops. As in the case of the overcrowd-
ing on the ships and the confusion on the 
docks, much of the controversy was stirred 
up by those reporting - accurately or in-
accurately - on the War, or by those wish-
ing to politically damage the McKinley 
administration. 
The service rendered by Captain James 
McKay, Jr. in the course of the Spanish-
American War was difficult and dangerous. 
He oversaw the loading and unloading of the 
supplies of the Fifth Corps in Tampa and at 
Daiquiri, and even accompanied some of 
these supplies to the front. The Captain as-
sisted the Quartermaster for the Fifth Corps 
and earned that gentleman's unwavering 
trust. McKay also earned the respect of the 
commanding general and most of the mem-
bers of his staff. To load nearly 17 ,000 offi-
cers and men onto 38 transports from a 
quay serviced by only one railroad line and 
do it in less than forty-eight hours is a 
remarkable feat. General Shafter had prom-
ised President McKinley that this would be 
done and Humphrey and McKay made it 
happen. At the other end of the line, McKay 
had to oversee the unloading of the stores at 
Daiquiri while Humphrey was doing similar 
duty at Siboney. Left alone with such re-
sponsibility, Captain McKay made sure of 
the safety of his vessels first and waited un-
til the pier was refurbished by the Army 
Corps of Engineers and it was safe to un-
load. Most of the stores he then unloaded 
were medical supplies in heavy demand at 
the front. Testimony by General John West-
on shows that McKay did his job well, 
promptly, and with utmost safety.28 That 
nearly everyone in command positions be-
lieved Captain James McKay, Jr. did his job 
efficiently is ample indication of the value of 
his services. More specific and public com-
memoration of this gallant service is long 
over-due. Captain McKay deserves to be rec-
ognized for his service in the war that 
opened the "American Century." 
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